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The increasing number of foresight programmes suggests that it can be a useful policy tool in 
rather different national innovation systems. Emerging economies – faced with a number of 
similar or same challenges when trying to find their new role in the changing international 
settings, while still characterised by their own distinct level of socio-economic development, 
set of institutions, behavioural norms and decision-making culture – can also benefit significantly 
from conducting foresight programmes. 
This paper is aimed at discussing the potential and actual role of foresight in governing 
policy processes, especially in the context of emerging economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). In doing so, first the theoretical underpinnings of this analysis is summarised 
briefly. Then the rationale of conducting foresight is presented: what policy challenges can be 
tackled by applying foresight? It is followed by a discussion of a new typology of foresight 
programmes, distinguishing the ones with an S&T, techno-economic or societal/ socio-
economic focus. The concluding section summarises the major lessons, but also presents 
some policy and methodological dilemmas. 
 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Foresight programmes do not have a single, all-encompassing theory to support them, and 
thus they rely on a range of – somewhat overlapping – theories and methods, including (i) 
evolutionary economics of innovation; (ii) sociology of science and technology; (iii) actor - 
network theories; (iv) political sciences analyses of policy processes; (v) communication, co-
operation, and participation theories; (vi) decision-preparatory and future-oriented methods, 
techniques. This list is far from exhaustive, and most likely disciples of these theories would 
change the grouping, the order of their own discipline or even the wording used here. That 
might be an interesting discussion in its own right, indeed, for theoretical purposes. Yet, the 
intention here is just to indicate the ‘eclectic’ – and thus complex – nature of foresight 
programmes, rather than attempting to provide a meticulous, comprehensive treatise of these 
issues. 
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This section is concerned with evolutionary economics of innovation1 because this theory 
provides useful observations to appreciate the relevance of foresight programmes from 
different angles. First, foresight (programmes), future, change, innovation and uncertainty are 
closely interrelated notions – and some of these are the underlying terms of evolutionary 
economics of innovation. Second, foresight programmes are important policy tools, and thus 
the nature of policy formation processes and the policy rationale of foresight programmes 
should be clearly understood (further explored in Section 3): 
 
2.1 The process of innovation and economic theories 
Obviously, no comprehensive overview on evolutionary economics of innovation can be 
provided here: only the main features are highlighted. 
Innovation, defined as “the search for, and the discovery, experimentation, development, 
imitation, and adoption of new products, new production processes and new organisational 
set-ups” (Dosi, 1988a, p. 222), leads to variety (diversity), and competition. The latter one, in 
turn, both conducive to innovation and induced by innovation, selects among firms (or 
organisations, more generally): 
In spite of the apparent similarity with biological processes, one should not mistakenly 
equate evolutionary economics with evolutionary biology. Freeman (1994b) highlights two 
fundamental differences. First, selection is at least partly conscious in the innovation process 
as decision-makers can choose between various ‘mutations’ (that is, new products, processes 
and organisational forms): Moreover, their expectations, hopes, plans and values also shape 
the ‘evolution’ of these ‘mutations’. Ethical and social considerations, therefore, play an 
increasingly important role in the innovation process, notably in the development and 
utilisation of nuclear energy and biotechnology, as opposed to the process of biological 
evolution. Second, selection is taking place at a number of levels in the course of competition: 
among products, firms (organisations), sectors, regions, countries and socio-economic 
systems. There are some autonomous rules and laws of the selection process at these different 
levels. Strong interrelations and interdependencies, however, can also be observed. 
Technological innovations are shaping both their natural and socio-economic environment, 
while the success of innovations strongly depends on their environment, including the 
quantity, quality and distribution of accumulated capital in the form of production equipment, 
roads, railways, communications networks, bridges, etc., as well as policies, attitudes and 
norms, that is, institutions in short. 
While rational agents in the models of neo-classical economics can optimise via 
calculating risks and taking appropriate actions, “innovation involves a fundamental element 
of uncertainty, which is not simply the lack of all the relevant information about the 
occurrence of known events, but more fundamentally, entails also (a) the existence of techno-
economic problems whose solution procedures are unknown, and (b) the impossibility of 
precisely tracing consequences to actions” (Dosi, 1988a, p. 222 – emphasis added): Thus, the 
notions of optimisation or maximisation become meaningless. 
Another important implication of uncertainty concerns the scientific and policy relevance 
of forecasting, based on the extrapolation of (supposedly) known trends. The space of events, 
in which forecasting can be meaningful is strictly limited: the only certain – and thus easily 
predictable – outcome of innovative activities is that most of the underlying technological and 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Dosi, 1988b, Dosi et al., 1988, 1994, Dodgson and Bessant, 1996, Dodgson and Rothwell, 1994, 
Edquist (ed.), 1997, Ergas, 1987, Fagerberg et al. (eds), 2005, Freeman, 1994a, Freeman and Soete, 1997, 
Lundvall (ed.), 1992, Lundvall and Borrás, 1999, Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998, Nelson (ed.), 1993, 1995, 
Nelson and Winter, 1982, OECD, 1992, 1997, 1998, 2001, Smith, 2002. 
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business trends can change quite radically even in the space of 10-15 years.2 From a policy 
perspective, therefore, new methods are required, which can take into account uncertainty 
during a decision-preparatory process. Foresight is a prominent one from this point of view, 
for two reasons. First, it is capable of dealing with uncertainty by devising alternative 
(qualitatively, or fundamentally different) ‘futures’ (visions of future, future states or 
scenarios): Indeed, it is a distinctive feature of foresight to consider alternative futures. 
Second, foresight processes can reduce uncertainty, too, because participants can align their 
endeavours once they arrive at a shared vision. To this effect, however, it is a necessary 
condition to involve the major stakeholders, who can significantly influence the underlying 
trends by shaping the strategies or policies of their respective organisations (government 
agencies, businesses, research organisations, NGOs, unions, etc. – depending on the issues in 
question, as well as the political and decision-making culture of the ‘entity’ conducting a 
foresight programme: international organisations or regions, nation states, sub-national 
regions, business associations, groups or individual firms, cities, etc.) 
As opposed to the ‘time-less’ world of neo-classical economics, “history counts: past 
technological achievements influence future achievements via the specificity of knowledge 
that they entail, the development of specific infrastructures, the emergence of various sorts of 
increasing returns and non-convexities in the notional set of technological options” (Dosi, 
1992, p. 183): In other words, technological change is a cumulative, path-dependent process, 
and hence increasing returns are at least as important as diminishing returns. Closely related 
notions, also in the heart of evolutionary thinking, are learning by doing, using, interacting 
(Freeman, 1994a) and comparing (Lundvall and Tomlinson, 2002): 
Mainstream economics is mainly concerned with the availability of information (or 
information asymmetries in its jargon): Both theoretical and empirical studies reflect, 
however, the growing recognition that the success of firms – regions and nations – depends on 
their accumulated knowledge, both codified and tacit,3 and skills, as well as learning 
capabilities. Information can be simply bought, and hence mainstream economics is 
comfortable with it. Knowledge – and a fortiori, the types of knowledge required for 
innovation – on the contrary, cannot be mistaken with goods that can be purchased and used 
instantaneously; one has to go through a learning process to acquire knowledge and skills.4 It 
obviously takes time and involves the process and costs of trial and error. Thus, the 
uncertain, cumulative and path-dependent nature of innovation is reinforced. 
An important aspect of learning should be underlined here, namely its level. Some 
analysts and policy-makers highlight network re-alignment and research, technological 
development and innovation (RTDI) policy updating as key foresight benefits – which are 
crucial impacts, depending on the ‘focus’ of a given foresight programme. (see Section 4.2.2 
on ‘focus’) Case studies and anecdotal evidence clearly suggest, however, that there are often 
overlooked or ‘hidden’ benefits relating to learning at the level of individuals and 
                                                
2 Obviously, there are certain trends, e.g. demographic ones, which are not directly influenced by innovative 
activities, on the one hand, and their ‘stability’ (predictability) extends to a much longer time horizon (in this 
case around 40-50 years), on the other. Also, the pace and intensity of innovative activities – and hence their 
impacts on major technological and business trends – vary significantly across time (different historical periods) 
and countries (socio-economic systems): 
3 For a brief, but highly informative, discussion of codified and tacit knowledge, and the policy relevance of this 
distinction, see Lundvall and Borrás, 1999 (especially pp. 31-33), as well as the literature they refer to. 
4 Borrowing a sparkling parable of Dosi, 1988b, although there are market conditions of access to information 
e.g. there is a market for textbooks and economic conditions of access to higher education (the level of tuition 
fees, the availability or scarcity of grants for students), “in any proper sense of the word, getting a PhD is not 
simply acquiring information, and it is even less true to say that there is a market for PhDs” (p. 1130): 
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communities. Actually, it is almost a commonplace among practitioners to refer to foresight 
as a learning process, although quite often they mean methodological learning. In any case, it 
might be a fruitful idea to make a clear distinction among the different levels of learning, i.e. 
not to focus exclusively at the ‘macro’ level, but give more prominence to individual and 
community learning when devising or evaluating foresight programmes. 
Cumulativeness, path-dependency and learning lead to heterogeneity among firms and 
other organisations. Moreover, sectoral characteristics of the innovation process should also 
be taken into account while devising strategy or policy.5 
A vast body of empirical literature has also clearly shown that innovators are not lonely 
scientists. While some path-breaking scientific or technological ideas might come indeed 
from individuals, successful innovations can only be generated by a close collaboration of 
different organisations such as: university departments, government and/or contract research 
labs, firms and specialised service-providers. Forms of their co-operation can also be varied 
widely from informal communications through highly formalised R&D contracts to alliances 
and joint ventures.6 Thus, conscious network-building efforts of foresight programmes are 
crucial, indeed – as well as their unintended impacts on networking (in case of the lack of 
explicit objectives to strengthen existing networks, facilitate the formation of new ones, and 
more generally, foster communication and co-operation; see Section 4.2 on different types of 
foresight programmes): 
 
2.2 Implications for RTDI policies 
Evolutionary account of the innovation process offers some sobering lessons: in a world of 
uncertainty, policy cannot bring about the optimum either. The policy-maker is not “a 
perfectly informed social planner correcting imperfect market signals to guide private 
decisions toward more desirable outcomes”. (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998, p. 94) Of course, 
this conclusion is not easy to accept, especially for those trained in the paradigm of 
rationality, maximisation and optimisation: 
“For obvious reasons, many economists prefer models that provide precise policy 
recommendations, even in situations in which the models are inapplicable to the world 
of our existence. Our own view is that, rather than using neo-classical models that give 
precise answers that do not apply to situations in which technology is evolving 
endogenously, it is better to face the reality that there is no optimal policy with respect 
to technological change.” (Lipsey and Carlaw, 1998, p. 48) 
Variety, selection and uncertainty also have repercussions on the very nature of policy 
and strategy formation, and thus decision-makers – either devising public policies or 
strategies for firms or RTDI organisations – should take into account these features. The 
relevant and potentially successful policies and strategies adaptive ones, relying on, and 
learning from, feedback from the selection process to the development of further variation. 
(Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998) In other words, policy and strategy formation is increasingly 
becoming a learning process. (Lundvall and Borrás, 1999, Teubal, 1998) This notion 
underlines the importance of foresight programmes: more ‘robust’ policies can be devised 
when (i) alternative futures are considered, and (ii) participants with different background are 
                                                
5 A seminal taxonomy developed in Pavitt, 1984 identifies supplier-dominated sectors, specialised suppliers, 
scale-intensive and science-based sectors. 
6 Freeman, 1991, 1994a and 1995 provided a thorough literature survey on the importance of networks and the 
innovation system approach. See also Edquist (ed.), 1997, Lundvall (ed.), 1992, Lundvall and Borrás, 1999, 
Nelson (ed.), 1993, OECD, 2001, Tidd et al., 1997, as well as the October 1991 and February 2002 issues of 
Research Policy (Vol. 20, No. 5, and Vol. 31, No. 2, respectively): 
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actively involved in a decision-preparatory process, and thus bringing wide-ranging 
accumulated knowledge, experience, aspirations, and ideas in. 
Some more instructive policy lessons can also be derived from evolutionary theorising: 
given the characteristics of the innovation process, public policies should be aimed at 
promoting learning in its widest possible sense, in other words competence building at 
individual, organisational and inter-organisational levels. Co-operation and networking 
among a host of actors, including not only researchers and producers but also users is a vital 
element in generating and disseminating knowledge. A system-approach is required, 
therefore, in policy-making, whereby “policies recognise the division of labour in the 
generation of innovation-relevant knowledge, that no individual firm is self-sufficient in its 
knowledge and skills and that there are corresponding gains from linking firms with the wider 
matrix of knowledge-generating institutions”. (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998, p. 84) Indeed, 
a recent trend in the RTDI policies of advanced countries is to shift from direct research and 
development (R&D) support to promoting linkages, communication and co-operation among 
the players in the innovation process and thus building an appropriate organisational and 
institutional infrastructure. (Dodgson and Bessant, 1996; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; OECD, 
1998); a special issue of Research Policy [Vol. 30, No. 6]; country reports on national 
innovation policies at http://www.proinno-europe.eu) 
Certain types of foresight programmes (see Section 4.2) can take into account these 
broader issues, as opposed to focussing narrowly on advancing scientific research in specific 
fields of enquiry or developing particular technologies. It, therefore, can be a crucial policy 
tool, especially if it is explicitly aimed at strengthening – regional, sectoral, national or trans-
border – innovation systems. (The network-building aspects of foresight programmes have 
already been discussed in Section 2.1.) 
Another major policy implication of this analytical framework is that conscious, co-
ordinated policy efforts are needed to promote knowledge-intensive activities in all sectors, 
with the explicit goal of upgrading firms’ capabilities, and thus improving their overall 
competitiveness. In other words, despite of the wide-spread believes in the ‘magic’ and 
automatic impacts of the so-called high-tech industries on economic growth, policy-makers 
should be aware of the importance of knowledge-content in the low- and medium-technology 
(LMT) industries, too.7 
An EC document also draws the attention of policy-makers to this conclusion in a 
balanced, succinct way: “The EIS [European Innovation Scoreboard – A.H.] has been 
designed with a strong focus on innovation in high-tech sectors. Although these sectors are 
very important engines of technological innovation, they are only a relatively small part of the 
economy as measured in their contribution to GDP and total employment. The larger share of 
low and medium-tech sectors in the economy and the fact that these sectors are important 
users of new technologies merits a closer look at their innovation performance. This could 
help national policy makers with focusing their innovation strategies on existing strength and 
overcome areas of weakness.” (EC, 2003, p. 20) 
Foresight programmes, therefore, need – and should – not be confined to the narrow field 
of high-tech sectors (or ‘advanced’ S&T topics): 
 
                                                
7 Just to prevent some potential misinterpretations, it should be stressed that this paper is not intended, of course, 
to advocate a ‘low-tech development path’ for emerging economies, or to ‘relegate’ them to the second or third 
‘technology division’ with low competitiveness, and hence low living standards. 
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2.3 Foresight, innovation and RTDI policies 
To avoid some potential misinterpretation, finally it should be stressed that opting for this 
theoretical framework does not mean that foresight should be understood as a vehicle to 
support narrowly defined (technological) innovation processes or RTDI policies. (See more 
on the policy rationale of the different types of foresight programmes in Section 4.2.) A 
narrow understanding would exclude, for example a foresight programme to create visions for 
cancer treatment.8 Two aspects need clarification: (i) the relationships between foresight and 
innovation; and (ii) the links between foresight programmes, RTDI and other policies. 
First, it might be useful to repeat that innovation should be understood as the introduction 
(practical application) of new or significantly modified products, production processes, 
services, as well as organisational and managerial practices (techniques): Thus, visions for 
new cancer treatments are about innovation, too, following this widely accepted broad 
definition: we should envisage not only new medicines (product innovations), but also new 
ways to ‘provide services’ in the health care system (service, process, organisational and 
managerial innovations):9 Moreover, visions generated by a foresight process would certainly 
encompass prevention, too (concerning diet, drinking and smoking habits, doing sports, 
reducing stress, etc.): This is also a new approach in terms of addressing an issue, i.e. a policy 
and organisational innovation at a social level – requiring new habits at an individual level. 
Also, new cancer treatments are likely to contribute to socio-economic development in several 
ways. To mention just two of them here: (i) in a narrow economic sense they can be cheaper 
or more efficient than the old ones, i.e. more patients can be cured faster (losing less time, 
which can be used for ‘productive’ purposes) and at lower costs; (ii) more broadly, the quality 
of life is improved when less people suffer from cancer, and less people should fear of cancer, 
due to better treatments. 
Second, so far it has only been emphasised that foresight is an important innovation 
policy tool. It should be added that it could be useful in other policy domains, too. The above 
example clearly shows that health policies also need to deal with – and promote – various 
types of innovations.10 
In sum, the subject itself is not a decisive factor for being ‘qualified’ as a foresight 
programme; what matters is to meet the three criteria set in Section 4.1. 
 
 
3 POLICY CHALLENGES: WHY TO CONDUCT FORESIGHT 
Foresight (or the use of some other methods to assist future-oriented thinking) offers a 
number of advantages for decision-makers: it is a tool to (i) recognise and emphasise the 
possibility of different futures (or future states), as opposed to the assumption that there is an 
already given, pre-determined future, and hence the opportunity of shaping our futures; (ii) 
enhance flexibility in policy making and implementation; and (iii) broaden perspectives, 
encourage thinking outside the box (“think of the unthinkable”): A number of major trends 
                                                
8 These observations are prompted by a question of Göran Pagels-Fick: “Could we envisage a foresight 
programme to create visions for cancer treatment practices?” 
9 This is a generally accepted definition of innovation by international organisations, such as the OECD and EU, 
shared by researchers and policy-makers, too. Quite often, however, other people, e.g. journalists and politicians 
still use the term in its narrow sense, i.e. they only refer to technological innovations. 
10 Ian Miles is among the pioneers to stress the importance of innovation in service sectors, and he has also 
written extensively on the role of innovation in services provided by the state, and thus on the need to devise 
appropriate policies in these fields to promote innovations. 
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affect all countries and most areas of policy-making, thus a new culture of future-oriented 
thinking is needed. 
Foresight programmes have been widely applied, especially since the 1990s. As a 
growing body of literature analyses this surge, the major factors explaining the diffusion of 
foresight can be summarised in a telegraphic style: 
• Globalisation, coupled with sweeping technological and organisational changes, as 
well as the ever-increasing importance of learning capabilities and application of 
knowledge have significantly altered the ‘rules of the game’. Thus, policy-makers 
have to take on new responsibilities (as well as dropping some previous ones), while 
firms must find new strategies to remain, or become, competitive in this new 
environment. 
• Given the above factors our future cannot be predicted by any sophisticated model. 
Planning or forecasting of our future becomes more and more ridiculed in light of 
rapid and fundamental changes. History also teaches us valuable lessons about the 
(im)possibilities of planning and predicting the future. Therefore, flexibility, open 
minds for and awareness of possible futures are inevitable. Diversity is a key word: 
diversity in scope (in terms of possible futures, differing analyses etc), as well as 
diversity in solutions or policy options. 
• Decision-makers face complex challenges: socio-economic and technological factors 
interact in defining issues of strategic importance, e.g.  
o education and life-long learning (new demands on education systems; new, mainly 
ICT-based tools and methods for teaching and learning; the growing need for 
interaction and co-operation with businesses); 
o environmental issues; 
o quality of life (health, education, demographic changes, especially the growing 
share and special needs of elderly people, living and working environment, social 
conflicts, crime prevention, etc.); 
o competitiveness (at national and EU-level for attracting talents and capital, at firm 
level maintaining and increasing market shares nationally and internationally, 
etc.); 
o regional disparities. 
• Most policy problems no longer have ‘self-evident’ solutions. Governments are forced 
to make use of ‘evidence-based policies’, policies based on knowledge/ insight into 
what works and what does not. 
• Policy-makers have to learn to cope with growing complexity and uncertainty of 
policy issues themselves. Thus, the precautionary principle is of a growing 
significance. 
• New skills and behaviour are required (e.g. problem-solving, communication and co-
operation skills in multidisciplinary, multicultural teams meeting more often only 
“virtually”, as well as creativity) if individuals or organisations are to prosper in this 
new setting. This, in turn, creates new demands on the education and training system 
(see above): 
• Clusters, networks (business – academia, business – business, both at national, 
international levels) and other forms of co-operation have become a key factor in 
creating, diffusing and exploiting knowledge and new technologies, and therefore in 
satisfying social needs and achieving economic success. 
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• There is a widening gap between the speed of technological changes and the ability to 
devise appropriate policies (which requires a sound understanding of the underlying 
causes and mechanisms at work.) 
• Given the growing political and economic pressures, governments try hard to balance 
their budgets: when cutting taxes, they need to reduce public spending relative to 
GDP. In the meantime accountability – why to spend taxpayers’ money, on what – has 
become even more important in democratic societies. Public R&D expenditures are 
also subjected to these demands. 
• Policy-makers also have to deal with intensifying social concerns about new 
technologies (mainly ethical and safety concerns in the case of bio- and nano- or 
nuclear technologies, and fears of unemployment and social exclusion caused by the 
rapid diffusion of new technologies in general): 
• Even the credibility of science is somewhat fading. Scientific research no longer 
stands for ‘true’ in itself. The ‘objectiveness’ of policies based on scientific research is 
questioned (by citizens, interest groups, etc.) as scientists themselves are known to 
have different opinions and come to different conclusions on the same issue. 
Besides the above trends, there are other specific, policy-relevant methodological reasons 
to apply foresight. First, it can offer vital input for ‘quantum leaps’ in policy-making in 
various domains. Usually policies evolve in a piecemeal way, in incremental, small steps. 
From time to time, however, a more fundamental rethinking of current policies is needed. In 
other words, policy-makers occasionally need to ask if current policies can be continued: do 
they react to signs of changes, block or accommodate future developments? 
The parable of the boiling frog illustrates this point ‘vividly’: put a frog in a cooking pot with 
cold water, and start heating the water. The frog will not jump out, because it does not alerted 
by the slowly rising temperature. It will boil alive. 
Second, foresight can also help in picking up weak signals: weak but very important 
signals that a fundamental re-assessment and re-alignment of current policies are needed. In 
other words, foresight can serve as a crucial part of an early warning system, and it can be 
seen as an instrument for an adaptive, ‘learning society’. 
In sum, participative, transparent, forward-looking methods are needed when decision-
makers are trying to find solutions for the above challenges. Foresight – as a systematic, 
participatory process, collecting future intelligence and building medium-to-long-term 
visions, aimed at influencing present-day decisions and mobilising joint actions (EC DG 
Research, 2002) – offers an essential tool for this endeavour. It helps in making choices in an 
ever more complex situation by discussing alternative options, bringing together different 
communities with their complementary knowledge and experience. In doing so, and 
discussing the various visions with a wide range of stakeholders, it also leads to a more 
transparent decision-making process, and hence provides a way to obtain public support. The 
foresight process can reduce uncertainty, too, because participants can align their endeavours 
once they arrive at shared visions. Many governments have already realised the importance of 
foresight activities, and thus this relatively new, and innovative, policy tool is spreading 
across continents.11 
The above general considerations apply in catching-up countries in the CEE region, too. 
Quite a few pressures – especially the need to change attitudes and norms, develop new skills, 
                                                
11 For a detailed and systematic analysis of the rationale for foresight and description of national exercises, see 
the articles, papers and books listed in the References. 
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facilitate co-operation, balance budgets – are even stronger than in the case of advanced 
countries. Moreover, most of these countries also have to cope with additional challenges: the 
necessity to find new markets; fragile international competitiveness; relatively poor quality of 
life; and brain drain. These all point to the need to devise a sound, appropriate innovation 
policy, and even more importantly, to strengthen their respective systems of innovation. 
Foresight can be an effective tool to embark upon these interrelated issues, too, if used 
deliberately in this broader context. 
Foresight can also contribute to tackle yet another challenge of emerging economies: 
most of them are struggling with ‘burning’ short-term issues – such as pressures on various 
public services, e.g. health care, education, pensions and thus severe budget deficit; 
imbalances in current accounts and foreign trade; unemployment; etc. – while faced with a 
compelling need for fundamental organisational and institutional changes. In other words, 
short- and long-term issues compete for various resources: capabilities (intellectual resources 
for problem-solving); attention of politicians and policy-makers who decide on the allocation 
of financial funds; and attention of opinion-leaders who can set the agenda (and thus influence 
discussions and decisions on the allocation of funds): These intellectual and financial 
resources are always limited, thus choices have to be made. A thorough, well-designed 
foresight process can help identify priorities, also in terms of striking a balance between short- 
and long-term issues. 
Further, foresight can offer additional “process benefits” in the CEE region. By debating 
the various strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities of a country posed by the 
catching-up process, and the role of universities and research institutes in replying to those 
challenges, the process itself is likely to contribute to realign the S&T system (including the 
higher education sector) to the new situation. An intense, high profile discussion – in other 
words, a wide consultation process involving the major stakeholders – can also be used as a 
means to raise the profile of S&T and innovation issues in politics and formulating economic 
policies. (Georghoiu, 2002) 
To conclude, foresight should not be conducted for its own sake – just because it is 
becoming “fashionable” throughout the world, and currently being promoted by international 
organisations. On the contrary, there should be a strong link between foresight, decision 
preparation and policy-making: foresight should be used as a policy tool to address major 
socio-economic and political challenges. It is not a panacea, however; it cannot solve all the 
problems listed above, and cannot solve any of them just on its own. Obviously, other 
methods and tools are also required, as well as an assiduous implementation of the strategies 
devised either at national, regional, sector or firm level. 
 
 
4 A TYPOLOGY OF FORESIGHT PROGRAMMES 
4.1. Locating foresight programmes among future-oriented analyses 
Decision-makers, experts and laymen in different historical periods and in different socio-
economic systems shared at least one desire: to know their future in advance or even to 
influence it for their advantage. They used very different approaches and methods from 
spiritual/ religious ones to scientific investigations and various modes of planning.12 Without 
going into details here, it is worth recalling some of the major methods/ approaches in order to 
locate – and distinguish – foresight programmes: 
                                                
12 Hence, a special chapter of the history of mankind can be devoted to these different attitudes, methods and 
approaches towards the future. 
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• visionary thinking (in ancient times by prophets, more recently mainly by consultants) 
• forecasting (at different levels, using different methods, e.g. trend analysis, 
extrapolation) 
• futures studies (for academic purposes) 
• prospective analyses (for business or policy purposes, e.g. [technology] roadmapping, 
list of critical/ strategic/ key technologies) 
• strategy formation (at firm, sectoral, regional or national levels) 
• scenario planning (at a firm level; see e.g. Godet, 2001) 
• indicative national planning 
• central planning (at a national level) 
• foresight programmes.13 
Obviously, the above approaches have a number of common characteristics. All of them 
(a) deal with the future(s) in one way or another; (b) collect and analyse various pieces of 
information, and (c) can apply a wide range of methods, mainly scientific ones. Three key 
features can be used to differentiate the above approaches, and thus distinguish foresight 
programmes from other methods. These approaches can: 
• be action-oriented vs. ‘contemplative’ (passive) 
• be participatory vs. non-participatory 
• consider alternative futures vs. a single future state (already ‘set’ by external forces): 
Action-oriented endeavours aim at shaping/ influencing/ acting upon the future,14 while 
passive ones are ‘contemplating’ about it (e.g. ‘pure’ futurologist studies, without any policy 
implications): In other words, the latter ones merely try to develop a better-informed 
anticipation of the future, e.g. for being better prepared by having more precise information. 
Participatory future-oriented programmes/ projects meet all the three following criteria: 
they (i) involve participants from at least two different stakeholder groups (e.g. researchers 
and business people; experts and policy-makers; experts and laymen); (ii) disseminate their 
preliminary results (e.g. analyses, tentative conclusions and policy proposals) among 
interested ‘non-participants’,15 e.g. face-to-face at workshops, electronically via the internet 
with free access for everyone, or in the form of printed documents, leaflets, newsletters; and 
(iii) seek feedback from this wider circle (again, either face-to-face or in a written form): 
Conversely, if any of these criteria is not met, that activity cannot be regarded a participatory 
programme or project. 
Finally, certain approaches are based on the assumption that the future is not pre-
determined yet; and thus the future can evolve in different directions, to some extent 
depending on the actions of various players and decisions taken ‘today’. In other words, there 
is a certain degree of freedom in choosing among the alternative, feasible futures, and hence 
increasing the chance of arriving at the preferred (selected) future state. Clearly, there is a 
                                                
13 The term ‘foresight programme(s)’ is used throughout this paper as an attempt to distinguish individual 
(personal) foresight and ‘collective’ foresight programmes, i.e. the ones launched (and sponsored) by an 
organisation (or several ones), and conducted by a number participants. Moreover, an increasing number of 
articles published by researchers working in the field of future studies, in which ‘foresight’ is used as a new label 
for their work (although still following the ‘futures studies’ or futurology paradigm), see e.g. the recent issues of 
Futures, especially Vol. 36, No. 2. It does not seem to be a productive, promising dispute trying to establish the 
‘real’ meaning of foresight, and then attempting to ‘enforce’ it across various communities of practice. 
14 E.g. the slogan of the first UK Foresight Programme was: “Shaping our future”. 
15 ‘Non-participants’ are those persons who have not been members of panels or working groups set up by the 
programme, and have not been involved directly in any other way, e.g. by answering (Delphi) questionnaires. 
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close link between being action-oriented and considering alternative futures.16 Other 
approaches, on the contrary, can only think of a single future, already ‘fixed’ by certain 
factors, and thus the task is to explore (forecast, predict) ‘the’ future scientifically.17 
In sum, foresight programmes are action-oriented, participatory and consider alternative 
futures. 
 
4.2 Focus of foresight programmes 
Foresight programmes may have rather dissimilar foci, ranging from the identification of 
priorities in a strict S&T context to addressing broad societal/ socio-economic challenges. 
Georghiou (2001) and (2002) identified three generations of prospective/ strategic 
technological analyses. This classification is used here as point of departure to develop a 
typology of foresight programmes to analyse their potential and actual role in policy-making. 
The first generation is the classical technological forecasting, aimed at predicting 
technological developments, based on extrapolation of perceptible trends.18 
The main aim of a second-generation foresight programme is to improve competitiveness 
by strengthening academy-industry co-operation, correcting the so-called market failure19 and 
trying to extend the usually too short time horizon of businesses.20 
A third-generation foresight programme tackles broad/er/ socio-economic challenges, and 
hence besides researchers and business people government officials and social stakeholders 
are also involved. 
Three ‘ideal types’ of foresight programmes can be defined as major ‘reference points’. 
Identifying ‘ideal types’ is a long-established practice in social sciences (and somewhat 
similar to ‘models’ used in all fields of sciences): “The fact that none of these three ideal 
types (…) is usually to be found in historical cases in ‘pure’ form, is naturally not a valid 
objection to attempting their conceptual formulation is the sharpest possible form.”21 (Weber, 
1947, reprinted in Pugh, 1988, p. 16) 
Note, however, that all three ideal types of foresight programmes should meet the criteria 
defined above in Section 4.1: they should be action-oriented, participatory and should 
consider alternative futures. The underlying difference among them is their focus: 
                                                
16 Some foresight programmes, e.g. the second Swedish Technology Foresight Programme, consider alternative 
futures with the explicit aim of identifying key choices confronting their ‘constituency’ or ‘target audience’, but 
do not intend to single out any preferred future. In other words, these programmes do not follow a normative 
approach. (This approach, and the example, has been mentioned by Göran Pagels-Fick among his comments on 
an earlier draft.) 
17 Cuhls (2003) offers an excellent, comprehensive discussion on the differences between forecasting, 
prediction, planning and foresight. The possibility of a single future vs. “many” futures is a central element of 
her analysis. 
18 These predictions are produced by a relatively small group of experts: futurologists and/or technological 
experts (that is, other types of expertise or actors are not sought after in the process of forecasting): The main 
objective is to predict which S&T areas are likely to produce exploitable results. Forecast results, in turn, are 
used in economic planning, either at firm or macro level. 
19 In short, private returns on R&D are smaller than social returns (as firms cannot appropriate all the profits 
stemming form R&D), and thus firms do not invest into R&D at a sufficient – socially optimal – level. 
20 Accordingly, a different set of actors is involved in these programmes: researchers working on various S&T 
fields and business people, bringing knowledge on markets into the process. These programmes are organised by 
following the structure of economic sectors (various industries and services): 
21 It is just a coincidence that Weber also talks of three ideal types when discussing legitimate authority. 
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• S&T issues: type A foresight programmes 
• techno-economic issues: type B foresight programmes 
• broad societal/ socio-economic issues: type C foresight programmes.22 
Their further characteristics, in terms of their aims, rationales and participants, are 
summarised in Table 1. One would notice immediately that these ideal types are not 
distinguished by their themes (topics): for example, they all deal with S&T issues, but by 
doing so, they pursue different aims, and follow different (policy) rationales. In other words, 
they address different challenges, ask different questions, use different approaches/ ways of 
thinking,23 and involve different participants. In other words, these ideal types should not be 
thought of as “Russian dolls”: the biggest one, type C incorporating the middle one, i.e. type 
B, and, in turn, type B encompassing the smallest one (the ‘core’), Type A. 
Table 1: Foci of foresight programmes 
 S&T focus (type A) Techno-economic 
focus (type B) 
Societal/ socio-economic 
focus (type C) 
Aims Identify S&T priorities 
(following the logic of 
scientific discovery) 
Identify research topics in 
S&T, of which results are 
believed to be useful for 
businesses 
Identify research topics in 
S&T, of which results are 
believed to contribute to 
addressing major societal/ 
socio-economic challenges 
Devise other policies – or 
identify policy domains, 
which are relevant – to 
tackle these societal/ socio-
economic issues 
Rationale Boost national prestige, 
achieve S&T excellence; 
Following the linear 
model of innovation, 
socio-economic benefits 
might also be assumed; 
implicitly or explicitly 
Business logic: improve 
competitiveness 
Correct market failures: 
strengthen academia-
industry co-operation, 
extend the short time 
horizon of businesses 
Improve quality of life 
(enhance competitiveness 
as a means for that) 
Correct systemic failures, 
strengthen the National 
Innovation System 
Participants Researchers, policy-






social stakeholders (lay 
persons?) 
Potential users usually constitute a broader group than the actual participants; they might 
include e.g. funding organisations, other policy implementation bodies and public service 
providers (including ‘quangos’ [quasi-NGOs]), professional associations representing the 
interests of their members (and thus involving them to some extent in strategy and policy 
                                                
22 In short, the most important modification compared to the three generations identified by Georghiou is to 
replace technology forecasting with foresight programmes focussing on S&T issues. Technology forecasting 
projects usually do not consider alternative futures, and most of them are not participatory either (as defined 
above in Section 4.1): However, there is no reason to assume that S&T issues cannot be tackled in a participatory 
manner, considering alternative futures, and aiming at informing and influencing present actions. For example, 
the recent Turkish Foresight Programme – the Vision 2023 Project – has focussed on S&T issues. (Tümer, 2004) 
23  See section 4.4 for more details on the differences in terms of questions, approaches – when analysing the 
same theme (technological field): 
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formation processes in various ways), venture capitalists, trade unions, etc. Depending on the 
focus of a foresight programme (the types of challenges/ issues considered), as well as the 
political culture of a given country or region, some of these potential users and stakeholders 
might become participants, too. In any case, it is not possible to establish a one-to-one 
relationship between an ‘ideal type’ of foresight and its participants beyond the ‘typical’ 
participants indicated in Table 1. The type and number of participants, the methods, channels 
and for a used their ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dialogues,24 as well as the intensity, quality and 
impacts of these dialogues is obviously a question for the individual description, analysis or 
evaluation of actual foresight programmes. 
Types A and B programmes have a longer tradition, and thus in general they are better 
known. Obvious examples are the Turkish Vision 2023 Project (type A) and the first UK 
Foresight Programme (Type B): (Tümer, 2004, and Georghiou, 1996, respectively) 
Therefore, only type C programmes are explained here in some detail. The shift in focus 
is reflected in the structure, too: these programmes are organised along major societal/ socio-
economic concerns (e.g. health, ageing population, crime prevention in the case of the 
Hungarian, the first Swedish or the second UK foresight programmes; see Boxes 1-2 in 
Section 4.3): A new element in the underlying rationale can also be discerned, the so-called 
systemic failure argument: the existing institutions (written and tacit codes of behaviour, rules 
and norms) and organisations are not sufficient to improve quality of life and enhance 
competitiveness, and thus new institutions should be ‘designed’ by intense communication 
and co-operation among the participants. In other words, the existing gaps should be bridged 
by new networks, appropriate policies aimed at correcting systemic failures, and establishing 
or strengthening relevant organisations. A foresight programme, based on this rationale, can 
deliver solutions in various forms: by strengthened, re-aligned networks as ‘process’ results of 
the programme, as well as by policy recommendations (‘products’): 
An actual foresight programme is likely to combine certain elements from various types. 
In most cases, however, one type of rationale would be chosen as a principal one; it thus 
would underlie the more detailed objectives and structure of a programme, as well as the 
choice of its participants. Otherwise, it would likely to lead to an incoherent – even chaotic – 
exercise, characterised by tensions between (a) the various objectives, (b) elements of its 
structure, (c) the objectives and methods, (d) the participants and objectives, and/or (e) among 
the participants themselves. A certain level of tension, however, might be quite useful – or 
even essential – to produce creative, innovative ideas and solutions, of course, but too intense 
and too frequently occurring – structural, inherent – conflicts would most likely tear a 
foresight programme apart. 
 
 
5 COHERENCE OF FORESIGHT PROGRAMMES 
5.1 Themes and time horizon 
At a first glance, the focus of a foresight programme determines the themes to be discussed/ 
analysed to a large extent. For instance, as already alluded, typical themes for a technology 
forecast or a type A foresight programme would be specific fields of science and technology, 
such as microelectronics, communications, bioinformatics, energy technologies, new 
                                                
24 Internal dialogues take place among the participants of a given programme, e.g. among panel members, 
between panels, between panels and the management team, between the steering group and panels – or any other 
internal groups of participants in case these ones have not existed. External dialogues are organised among the 
participants and other stakeholders, clients, target groups, etc., i.e. those, who have not participated in the 
programme in a direct way. 
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materials, bio- and nanotechnology. These topics have been dictated to a non-negligible 
extent by ‘fashion’ or fads, too: earlier much had been written on nuclear and space 
technologies, then came ICT to yield significance, and more recently the fields denoted by 
prefixes of ‘bio-’ and ‘nano-’ have taken the centre stage. 
The time horizon can be driven by the dynamics of a given discipline or the imagination 
(agenda) of the futurists. For the latter, perhaps an extreme example is when Molitor (2000) 
predicts the weight and height of human beings in 3000. He has also published a book entitled 
The Next 1000 Years. It is not uncommon, however, to try to predict major events in a 50-100 
years time horizon. 
The so-called critical or key technologies method is also concerned with technological 
fields – as its name clearly indicates – but in this case the time horizon is much shorter, 
usually 5-10 years, as it is derived from policy-makers’ needs to set mid-term priorities. 
A typical type B foresight programme, e.g. the first UK one, deals with economic sectors, 
such as chemicals, construction, financial services, food and drinks, leisure and learning, 
retailing and distribution, transport, as well as technological fields, such as aerospace and 
defence, communications, IT and electronics, life sciences, materials. The time horizon in this 
case was 15-20 years, similar to a number of other national foresight programmes. 
At a national level, only a handful of type C foresight programmes have been conducted 
so far. As already mentioned, these are concerned with broad societal/ socio-economic issues, 
such as human resources, health, ageing population, crime prevention, usually with a time 
horizon of 20-25 years. 
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Box 1: UK1 and UK2 foresight themes  
UK 1st round (1994-99) UK 2nd round (1999-2002) 
Science driven sectors: Thematic panels 
Chemicals Ageing population 
Defence and aerospace Crime prevention 
Health and life sciences Manufacturing 2020 
Materials Sector panels 
Exploitation sectors: Built environment and transport 
Communications Chemicals 
Financial services Defence aerospace and systems 
Food and drink Energy and natural environment 
IT and electronics Financial services 
Policy driven sectors: Food chain and crops for industry 
Agriculture, natural resources and environment Healthcare 
Energy Information, communications and media 
Retailing and distribution Marine 
Transport Materials 
Human resource and management driven 
sectors: 
Retail and consumer services 
Construction  
Leisure and learning  
Manufacturing, production and business 
processes 
 





Box 2: Hungarian and Swedish foresight themes  
TEP, Hungarian Foresight Programme (1998-
2000) 
Swedish Foresight Programme 
(1998-2000) 
Human resources Health, medicine and care 
Health (life sciences, health care system, life style, 
pharmaceuticals, medical instruments) 
Biological natural resources 
Natural and built environment Society’s infrastructure 
Information technologies, telecommunications, media Production systems 
Manufacturing and business processes (new materials, 
production processes and management techniques, 
supplier networks) 
Information and communications systems 
Agri- and food businesses Materials and material flows in the 
community 
Transport Service industries 
 Education and learning 




5.2 Different approaches to the same theme 
A premature conclusion from the above examples would suggest a mechanistic link between 
the focus and themes of a given foresight programme, as well as between themes and time 
horizons. A more detailed look, however, would reveal there is no strict one-to-one 
relationship in either case. E.g. information and communication technologies (ICTs) are 
usually analysed by all sorts of foresight programmes – with important differences, of course: 
• in a critical (key) technologies programme the emphasis would be on specific 
technological terrains of this broad field, usually with a 3-5-year time horizon, and 
hardly any attention would be devoted to social issues (e.g. exclusion – inclusion of 
certain social groups; gaps between generations, or regions, cities and villages; e-
democracy; regulations on, and incentives for, different types of content; etc.); 
• a type A foresight programme would also put the emphasis on – the usually assumed 
positive – technical aspects (including perhaps also the overall impacts on the society 
in general, i.e. not differentiated/ elaborated by social strata; but not considering the 
potential impact the other way around, that is, how socio-economic needs and trends 
would shape technological developments): These programmes opt, however, usually 
for a significantly longer time horizon (say, 20-25 years) than the one used in a critical 
(key) technologies programme. 
• a type B foresight programme is likely to focus on broader technological fields – as 
opposed to specific sub-fields analysed by the critical technologies approach.25 It 
would pay much more attention to the economic (market) aspects than the above ones, 
and perhaps would discuss some social factors, too, as they shape demand, but not 
much elaboration can be expected on social challenges (either dealing with the new 
ones caused/ accentuated by ICT or asking how ICT can contribute to tackle existing 
                                                
25 Yet, in the first UK programme, IT, electronics and communications were not integrated into a single panel. 
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social challenges): The usual time horizon is around 10-15 years when this approach is 
chosen. 
• a distinctive feature of a type C foresight programme is the marked, deliberate shift 
towards precisely to those societal/ socio-economic aspects which are neglected by all 
the other approaches, and thus mentioned above as “negative examples”. Technical 
aspects, however, are not ignored by this approach, either, but discussed in a different 
context (also usually in a more integrated way, e.g. ICT and various types of media are 
understood as a complex, closely inter-related entity): other types of questions are 
asked, and new drivers and shapers come to the forefront. The time horizon, therefore, 
is also determined by the socio-economic issues identified by the programme: it would 
depend on the amount of time required to change the underlying settings, to influence 
the major shaping factors so as to achieve a certain (desirable) future state. (In other 
words, the time horizon cannot be shorter than the period of time needed for a change 
aspired by the programme.) 
ICT has been used as an example here because it is – by definition – a technology, and as 
it is a significant one; thus, it is no surprise at all that various types of technology foresight 
programmes would deal with this issue. Non-technological topics – such as human resources, 
crime prevention, etc. – on the contrary, are only addressed by type C programmes as major 
issues. (This is not to be mistaken with the fact that some socio-economic factors might be 
included in a type B foresight programme as shapers influencing market dynamics – as 
mentioned above.) 
Finally, it goes without saying that some inherent features of a given topic to be analysed 
also have repercussions on the time horizon. Usually changes take much more time e.g. in the 
field of agriculture (classical breeding), environment, education or in demographic trends than 
in rapidly evolving technologies, such as ICT or biotechnology. These determinants should 
not be ignored, and various themes/ topics of a given foresight programme, therefore, might 
have different time horizons. 
In sum, although there is a great deal of overlap in terms of broad themes discussed by 
various types of foresight programmes, a closer look clearly shows that these apparently same 
topics are dealt with in rather different manners. A different focus means that different 
approaches are applied when analysing seemingly similar issues: a different set of questions 
are asked, and hence various – social, technological, economic, environmental and political – 
factors and values are taken into account to a different degree (some of these factors not at all 
in certain foresight programmes) by a different set of participants (technology experts, 
business people, researchers, policy-makers, lay people): The time horizon, in turn, is 
determined to some extent by the inherent (technical, social, etc.) features of the various 





Decision-makers face increasingly complex issues, given that economic, technological 
environmental – and thus social – challenges are brought to any nation sate rather quickly, 
due the forces of globalisation, and these challenges are usually inherently inter-linked. 
Technological changes cause economic, environmental and social threats and opportunities; 
economic resources are required to finance public policies aimed at tackling these issues (e.g. 
harnessing technological change, preventing environmental crises, preventing social 
explosions, etc.); and government policies are under ultimate social control (in democratic 
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societies through a number of institutions, formal and direct, as well as informal and indirect 
ways, in other cases by more costly, more radical, yet, less frequently applied mechanisms): 
Both theoretical considerations and actual cases clearly show that foresight can be a 
relevant decision-preparatory tool in a number of policy fields – well beyond science and 
technology. In other words, it is time to embrace this broader notion of foresight. This paper 
has attempted to contribute to the diffusion of this new understanding by distinguishing and 
discussing three different foci of foresight programmes, namely pure S&T, techno-economic 
and societal/ socio-economic ones. 
Foresight processes can assist decision-makers in this complex environment to reduce 
technological, economic or social uncertainties by identifying various futures and policy 
options, make better informed decisions by bringing together different communities with their 
complementary knowledge and experience, obtain public support by improving transparency, 
and thus improve overall efficiency of public spending. 
It is crucial to prove the relevance of foresight for decision-making: its timing and 
relevance to major issues faced by societies, as well as the quality of its ‘products’ – reports 
and policy recommendations – are critical. Only substantive, yet carefully formulated 
proposals can grab the attention of opinion leaders and decision-makers, and then, in turn, the 
results are likely to be implemented. Otherwise all the time and efforts of participants put into 
a programme would be wasted, together with the public money spent to cover organisational 
and publication cost. The so-called process results – e.g. intensified networking, 
communication and co-operation among the participants – still might be significant even in 
this sad case, but they are less visible, and much more difficult to measure. Thus, the chances 
of a repeated programme – when it would be due again given the changes in the 
circumstances – are becoming really thin. 
Foresight can be relevant even in emerging countries, too, not being in the forefront of 
technological development but rather in the semi-periphery. A number of factors seem to 
contradict this conclusion at first glance. Foresight is costly in terms of time and money, but 
even more so in terms of the participants’ time required by meetings, workshops and surveys. 
Moreover, advanced countries, whose experts, in turn, know more about the leading edge 
technologies, regularly conduct their foresight programmes, and their ‘products’ – reports, 
Delphi-survey results – are readily available. Yet, only a national programme can position a 
country in the global context and spark a discussion on how to react to major trends. 
Similarly, SWOT of a given country would not be analysed by others, let alone broad socio-
economic issues. Process benefits cannot be achieved without a national programme either. 
Without these, a country would not be able to improve the quality of life of her population 
and enhance her international competitiveness. 
The current structural changes in the world economy and the emergence of new, global 
concerns related to environmental, health and demographic issues, imply that the scenario 
method may be relevant not only in transition economies, per se, but also in countries with 
long-established, crystallised institutional systems. A growing body of literature suggests that 
technological and socio-economic changes are intertwined. Scenario workshops, therefore, 
can contribute to a better understanding of these complex relations, leading to policy 
proposals, which help in making appropriate choices in an increasingly complex environment. 
Further, the Delphi-method, taken alone, can facilitate the foresight process only to a limited 
extent, and thus the process benefits are bound to be limited, too. 
Yet, it is important to highlight some dilemmas, too, which are partly to do with policy, 
and partly methodological in character: 
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• How to solve the inherent contradiction between the long-term nature of foresight 
issues (policy recommendations), on the one hand, and the substantially shorter time 
horizon of politicians (and some policy-makers), on the other? 
• What organisational set-up is necessary to ease another inherent contradiction between 
the need for a strong (but ‘reserved’) political support (or ‘embeddedness’) for a 
foresight programme on the one hand, and for enjoying intellectual, organisational, 
financial independence from any government agency, on the other? 
• How to overcome the departmentalised government structures when policy proposals 
tackling complex issues (such as health, quality of life, environment, competitiveness, 
etc.) should be discussed and implemented, i.e. public resources – both financial and 
intellectual ones – should be pulled together to make a real difference in an efficient, 
that is, co-ordinated way, yet, they are allocated to different ministries and other 
government agencies? 
International co-operation can enhance the chances of success by sharing lessons, easing 
the lack of financial and intellectual resources through exploiting synergies and economies of 
scale. Yet, its more ambitious form, i.e. a joint foresight exercise on trans-border issues also 
necessitates methodological innovations. International organisations can also facilitate 
foresight programmes in emerging countries, and more specifically collaboration among 
them. It is crucial, however, to maintain the commitment of local actors, e.g. in terms of time 
and funds devoted to the programme, willingness to implement of the results. In other words, 
the main forms of foreign assistance should be the provision of knowledge-sharing platforms 
and other fora to exchange experience (among emerging economies as well as with advanced 
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